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1 Introduction – ‘What do I do next?’ 
A surge of new terms denotes the emerging birth pangs of a new era. TechnoScienceSociety 
(TSS), Anthropocene (Pálsson et al. 2012), metamorphosis (Beck 2016), etc…  All hope to 
capture a significant global discontinuity of unprecedentedly far-reaching ontological human-
constructed novelty and thus of equally unprecedented responsibility; responsibility for all 
this innovation and even for “reality itself”.   
 
‘TechnoScienceSociety’ aims to capture something specific about this and regarding the 
importance of STS and the new directions STS must take in responding to this imperative. As 
I understand it, TSS connotes the condition of intra-active and mutually implicated crises, 
specifically of each of ‘technology’, ‘science’ and (the familiar and conventional mechanisms 
of public, socio-political and administrative governance that are) ‘society’ considered 
individually vis-à-vis a world in which they are being brought into multiple and deepening 
but novel, inseparable and as-yet ungovernable conjunction (= ‘TSS’) while also generating 
novel insoluble problems in the process. Moreover, these crises for each of ‘society’, 
‘technology’ and ‘science’ concern both their productivity on their own terms (e.g. for 
science, of new knowledge) and their capacity for problem-solving of contemporary real 
world issues, which as intrinsic and extrinsic conditions together construct their public 
legitimacy.1  This suggests the global turbulence may be understood as a game of ‘catch-up’ 
regarding forms of government (in the Foucauldian sense of the conduct of conduct) and 
politics up to the task of governing and fostering this new world, i.e. of government by 
techno-science-society of techno-science-society itself.  This is thus a challenge of emergence, 
and one that places ‘science’ and ‘technology’ – or better research & innovation, or better 
1 See respectively, chapters by []. 
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 still their conjunction as techno-science-society – at the heart of contemporary issues of 
government and politics.   
 
But this is not just a matter of redecorating the edifice of our old politics with the new 
furniture of contemporary ideas and issues. Too much has changed and is changing for that 
approach to work – and, indeed, not to exacerbate present system failures.  For TSS is a new 
ontological predicament and one that is profoundly challenging at present in both the speed 
and slowness of its emergence.  In short, there is no shortage of evidence today that TSS is 
emerging primarily in deeply troubling forms.   
 
“What can be done?” thus becomes the primary issue for TSS, as new practical and political 
challenge of how to respond, and respond prospectively and constructively, in the face of 
such irreducible complexity and uncertainty.  For without prospect of rational mastery what 
emerges clearly is the irreducibly practical nature of the imperative, still firmly in place, of 
knowledgeably guiding such complex systems, a knowing that is only now possible situated 
within such systems and through the active process of interaction with them.  In this 
pragmatised, situated, processual and limited perspective of knowledge, then, we are no 
longer discussing adequate means for the definitive achievement of clear ends, abandoning 
also the subject-object dualism underpinning this dichotomy.  Rather we have practices of 
learning that build up deepening capacities of skilful, complexity-attentive judgement, which 
in turn underpins those practices.  ‘Transition’ and subsequent ‘maintenance’, e.g. of the 
government of TSS, are thus seen to be simply different temporal gazes on the same process 
at different stages of its fruition.  
 
TSS thus spells the wholesale reorganization of the constellation of related concepts that 
together make up the very common-sense meaning of ‘politics’ and ‘government’, not least 
of which today are knowledge, science, technology and society, all of which are currently 
founded on essentially literal, dualistic not pragmatic, processual grounds.  We will argue 
here that grappling with TSS and a politics of TSS demands a shift broadly from a 
universalist (if possibly critical) epistemo-politics of critique or criticism to an onto-politics 
of situated practical wisdom (phronesis).  Important pointers in this direction come from 
existing work in actor network theory (ANT)-inspired STS.  But while useful starting points, 
this work is also insufficient in some key regards, to the point that we must now move 
beyond it.  In particular, the need for a shift to a situated, processual and practically engaged 
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 perspective applies no less to discussions such as this in STS.  We here trace out some of the 
argument for, and consequences of, that move.  
 
The argument proceeds as follows.  First we will consider the after-ANT argument of 
ontological politics and how this demands a break with the familiar epistemological and ‘one 
world’ politics still dominating contemporary discourse, mainstream and critical.  Then we 
consider some of the key problems with this conception of ontological politics vis-à-vis the 
predicament of an emerging TSS. This includes a brief discussion of an alternative 
perspective, of complex power/knowledge systems (CP/KS) within a phronetic onto-politics.  
Finally, we illustrate the arguments by analysing, using this CP/KS and onto-political 
perspective, a key case study of contemporary TSS: the ongoing attempts of innovation 
towards a transition in urban mobility system in China.   
 
2 Ontological Politics and TechnoScienceSociety 
The predicament of TSS, and its skilful government, is greatly illuminated by ANT and the 
post-ANT discussion of ontological politics.   ANT provides thick empirical description of 
heterogeneous assemblages of humans and non-humans, thereby showing how knowledge too 
is an enacted achievement of such processes of effortful construction, not the rational 
uncovering of a priori truths.   This is thus a non-teleological and empirically-grounded 
account of an ontology of multiple concrete actor-networks for which some apparent closure, 
for instance into what we call ‘facts’, ‘structures’ or ‘identities’, can only be achieved in 
actual practice, and so that are necessarily unknowable abstractly and in advance.  Such 
picture clearly resonates strongly with precisely the political predicament of TSS regarding 
both the abstract challenge of complexity and unknowability and the more concrete one of 
firmly grasping the extraordinary ontological productivity of the endeavour ANT fuses into 
techno-science.  
 
But it also follows from this account that there are not just different perspectives on a 
common, singular reality, as is generally supposed, but rather multiple realities. This shift not 
only undermines the clear distinction between knowledge and reality. It also necessarily has 
profound implications for politics, including the politics of STS, given the presupposed 
importance of the category of knowledge in contemporary default understandings of both 




 STS started as a form of science and technology criticism (if not critique), following Kuhn’s 
historicizing of the process of scientific knowledge construction together with 
contemporaneous political and normative concerns about specific scientific developments. 
This was based on a philosophical triad: ontological realism, epistemic relativism and a 
conception of critical social science as guidance and illumination to political praxis, holding 
actual S&T to explanatory and normative account vis-à-vis the (single) reality.  Let us call 
this epistemo-politics: a now post-Enlightenment, post-positivist politics built on and against 
the still-dominant common-sense presumptions of reason, reality and progressive social 
Enlightenment of which science itself is usually such an important standard-bearer.  
 
As the empirical fecundity of less realist approaches became apparent through strong social 
constructivist and then ANT research, however, this edifice became increasingly shaky.  But 
the major blows to epistemo-politics come from (‘after’-)ANT at the turn of the century 
onwards; through attention to the growing socio-political centrality and complexity of 
political (and not just scientific) controversies centrally involving S&T issues, and the 
growing evidence of the inadequacy of the ‘many views on one world’ approach.  
Symptomatically, these are inadequacies of explanation only secondarily, and primarily 
inadequacies in politics and practical understanding: e.g. how environmental controversies 
prove so resilient to ‘the facts’, this then raising questions regarding ‘which facts?’ or rather 
‘whose facts?’ and thence ‘whose objects and cosmologies/ontologies?’.   
 
This led to formulation of a picture of never-ending jostling amongst multiple lived realities 
and ontologies of what is in the world (Latour 2004), including both human and non-human 
agencies (the latter including both ‘nature’ and ‘technology’) and with the latter often vastly 
outnumbering and/or outweighing the former in any given actor-network; a move that further 
heightens the relevance of ANT to discussions of TSS given the characteristic proliferation in 
the latter condition of precisely such human-techno-natural assemblages. This conception is 
thus clearly set against the more orthodox presumption of political contestation being 
amongst rationally cognizing (human) agents by argument, supposedly moving to rational 
consensus.  These theoretical developments were then propelled by political objection and 
experience regarding the residual politically-troubling epistemic superiority implicit in the 





 The classic statement of ‘ontological politics’ is Mol (1999). Tracing ANT’s shift in 
emphasis from analysis of the relation between knowledge/science and reality to that between 
reality and politics, Mol uses the example of anaemia to show how ANT reveals multiple 
realities not just multiple perspectives. Anaemia, here, is not a singular reality manifest in 
three settings (‘pathophysiological’, ‘statistical’ and ‘clinical’) that may sometimes disagree 
with each other; but actually three different, if overlapping, phenomena that are then 
constructed, more or less successfully, – and then commonly treated or mistakenly ‘known’ 
as – singular.  For (after-)ANT, therefore, anaemia is nothing but the contingent assemblage 
of diverse phenomena, human and non-human, technoscientific and somatic, that in any 
given particular case achieves a diagnosis and subsequent treatment as ‘anaemia’; and there 
are three of these realities that go under the same name.     
 
This account thus presents the essential qualitative ontological sameness of ‘technology’, 
‘science’ and ‘society’, rather than their a priori difference, and hence affords accounts of 
their mutual and novel implication, conjunction and interaction that speak directly to the 
challenge of (understanding) TSS.  Moreover, regarding a new politics of TSS, then, the most 
obvious questions that arise concern both the multiplicity and contingency of realities 
constructed with technoscientific activity.  On the one hand, other realities could (have) be(en) 
constructed as dominant instead of those that currently prevail. Different understandings of 
the world and different socio-political positionings would then be privileged (as ‘natural’, 
‘real’ and ‘rational’).  On the other, the realities that have actually been constructed thereby 
contingently enable and disable some of the humans and non-humans all inter-dependently 
involved in the construction of that world.  While this may not matter particularly regarding 
anaemia, in the case of infrastructure mega-projects the symmetrical attention to humans and 
non-humans reveals how rivers and streams, for instance, or the planetary ecology as a whole 
are recruited and disciplined in such processes, and likely with little attention to their own 
integrity as agents (Rowland & Passoth 2014). This is thus to highlight crucial political issues 
for TSS that are otherwise occluded.  
 
But things are then immediately complicated further by ANT.  In that any given 
heterogeneous, enacted assemblage is not the result of any identifiable agential choice. 
Indeed, even the subjects and their knowledge(s) are as much results of this construction.  
Against a founding premise of epistemo-politics – the pre-eminence of rational agency –, 
therefore, a world of multiple, possibly novel and/or proliferating technoscience-mediated 
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 realities calls for a concept of politics that is substantially alien to incumbent common-sense: 
not just in terms of being concerned with (as object) the very substance of particular realities, 
rather than contending perspectives on and explanations of it; but also in terms of it not being 
primarily conducted through and regarding such cognitive positions (as subject and means).  
And yet it is recognisably and undeniably politics nonetheless given the ways in which 
different assemblages privilege and penalize both differentially and contingently.  
 
For Mol, multiple worlds and their inseparable knowledges give rise to an ‘ontological 
politics’ of multiple dispersed and empirical recalcitrances, hence one conducted 
ontologically.  But also, true to ANT, one without (definitive) agency, directability or 
direction. And without which, in reflexive coherence, nothing much informative can be said 
in the abstract.  It all depends – on what/who/how the specific issue is formed and enacted.  
Ontological politics thus becomes defined as a process of interference of what seem post hoc 
to have emerged as contingent ‘choices’ of one ‘world’ over another.   This also implies a 
new and different relation with (what still gets called) ‘social science’: an ‘associational’ 
analysis (Latour 2005), tracing the empirical connections in particular cases. Hence not 
serving up totalizing and explanatory critique but rather new, detailed, effortfully-constructed 
descriptions that may themselves directly be ontopolitical interferences, opening up given 
common-senses of what/who matters (ontologically) and does not.  This is thus a politics as 
permanent meta-political process of iconoclasm and stirring up regarding specific issues and, 
in the process, thereby constantly reproblematizing ‘one-worldism’ and the seemingly 
resilient human compulsion to treat as singular that which (ANT claims) is multiple.   
 
Finally, then, this is not just a non- (indeed anti-) utopian politics, not motivated by and 
condensed around a Grand Vision; but also one that does not even claim or expect, much less 
strive for, relatively predictable outcomes from its political engagements. Regarding the key 
question of TSS regarding prospective practical guidance, therefore, it appears that an ANT 
ontological politics can offer only limited assistance.  At most, this approach affords post hoc 
grounds for political strategic judgement as criticism (not critique) from the thick description 
of existing closures; and/or a counsel to the epistemically modest goal of a programme of 
unrelenting Baconian experimental tormenting of given realities-cum-common-senses to see 
what these interferences achieve and to prevent one-worldist common-senses from 
solidifying in the first place.  At the least, however, a post-ANT approach can offer no 
guidance at all, as in the case of future actor-networks that are, by definition, inaccessible to 
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 thick description as not yet actual; or, more abstractly and ethically, in the turn instead to an 
orientation of care or concern that simply embraces the total bafflement of rational mind 
implicit in complex, concrete network realities and their ceaseless and unmasterable rising 
and falling, and so chooses to take an undifferentiated positive affective gaze to all things and 
eventualities.  
 
Such responses are understandable and not unpersuasive.  Certainly, an ANT ontological 
politics brings out particularly clearly the self-defeating irrelevance of a post-Enlightenment 
epistemo-politics in that the more such world mastery is attempted the more it simply 
encounters (and itself elicits) further (possibly novel) recalcitrances, in a treadmill that has, 
with the emergence of TSS, reached planetary proportions (Latour 2013).  Positively, 
therefore, this approach highlights the need for a paradigm shift in common-sense, 
abandoning the realist concepts of modernity – not least ‘technology’, ‘science’, ‘society’ –in 
search of new and empirically-grounded ones of their overlapping construction into manifold 
techno-science-social worlds.   
 
As such ontological politics also captures crucial aspects of the ethical/normative challenge 
of TSS, in that it essentially grasps the extraordinary ontological productivity of 
contemporary technoscience and the responsibility this brings with it.  This includes showing 
clearly how contemporary default understandings stand in the way of assuming that 
responsibility by soothing us with false reassurances about the necessary progressiveness to 
human mastery implicit in ‘science’, ‘technology’ and ‘society’, there presupposed 
irreducibly in their very meaning.  In short, ANT ontological politics brings to life how these 
concepts are not only not essentially good, but that they are not even essentially anodyne.  To 
the contrary, they are potentially (and have proved in fact to be) massively destructive, 
particularly of ‘other’ humans and non-humans (and their cosmologies), and especially where 
they are indeed vested with such unreflective ‘progressive’ and tacitly imperialistic 
commitments. If this does not strike us into over-awed, ethically reflective silence, what will? 
 
3 From Ontological Politics to Phronetic Onto-Politics 
This is a compelling new vista of how profoundly ‘politics’ must be rethought before we can 
grapple with the multiple realities being continually constructed in the technosciencesociety 
that ANT also effectively describes.  But for all these important ways in which it illuminates 
the predicament of TSS, ANT ontological politics still does not address the key pragmatic 
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 challenge discussed above, which can specified now even more clearly as: if and how it is 
possible to conceive of politics within an account of reality of complex assemblages of 
human and non-human agents, and to do so in a forward-looking way that can inform (re-
)constructive practice in real-time, not just as retrospective accounts in thought of what has 
already happened?2 
 
Phrased thus, however, the political priority of TSS emerges as different to that of after-ANT: 
no longer (just, or even primarily) the problematic proliferation of novel technoscientific-
mediated worlds not held sufficiently to account, as specific, manifest issues and their evident 
contestations and even injustices; but now also the problematic slowness of the emergence of 
better such worlds.  Meanwhile, the current relentless emergence of TSS presents deepening 
and accelerating positive feedback loops of innovation focused on facilitating ever-more 
individualized consumerism, corporate-financial appropriation and corporate-state violence, 
engendering worsening environmental, geopolitical and socio-economic crises.  These 
dynamics must be actively displaced not merely destroyed. In short, the political problem of 
the present is as much, if not primarily, one of the urgent need for construction of new 
sociotechnical assemblages.  And where these must be both successfully expedited (vs. 
incumbent system lock-ins) and somehow qualitatively ‘guided’ in terms of the specific 
social futures to which they are giving rise; an intrinsically political question.  
 
To be sure, the tools and insights of an ANT-inspired perspective certainly could, and have, 
furnished significant insights regarding such a politics (e.g. Passoth & Rowland 2010, Barry 
2013).  But what we may crudely characterize (with my apologies) as a ‘pure’ ANT approach 
tends not to, since – and to the extent that – it is framed as an intellectual endeavour of the 
observer-analyst.  Conversely, we here argue for an approach that builds on the insights of 
ANT but does so while fully embracing the key challenge of TSS and hence rebases the 
analysis itself in an explicitly pragmatic, processual and strategic approach that is directly 
engaged in the problem field that it is studying.3  This is provided by a turn towards 
phronesis – or situated, strategic and power-aware wisdom – whereupon the ANT ontological 
politics analysis remains an important step but no longer the only, nor the final, one.  And in 
2 I thank one of the anonymous referees for helping with this formulation.  
3 By ‘strategic’ I mean not means/end calculative reasoning but the more circumscribed and itself processualized, 
complexified sense of intelligent, productive but limited self-conscious guidance of conduct implicit in 




                                                 
 a process of engagement with TSS that not only illuminates TSS better but also, in doing so, 
is directly the cultivation of the wise government of complex systems that it is seeking to 
move towards.  Instead of wasting the potential contribution of ANT to TSS, therefore, it is 
harnessed, but only by taking a key step beyond ANT towards its regrounding in an 
essentially pragmatic, engaged project.  
 
What is meant by ‘phronesis’? Phronesis is the third form of knowledge outlined by Aristotle, 
alongside techne and episteme.  It is a practical wisdom that is irreducibly situated and the 
basis of skilful judgement relevant to the specific and unique situation in play.   As such, it is 
also always the presupposed basis for the successful deployment of techne and episteme, as in 
the tacit skills and embodiments of the master plumber or laboratory scientist.  Yet, while the 
latter two are utterly familiar – the work of consultants and ‘disinterested’ academics 
respectively –, phronesis has been systematically ignored, or even disparaged, in the modern 
period.  Today, however, in a moment of the exceptional overlapping crises of the emergence 
of TSS both of these familiar forms of knowledge are self-evidently inadequate in the face of 
these wicked problems (as ‘technology’ and ‘science’ respectively) yet we have just as much 
need for knowledgeable guidance as ever, if not more so.  What is needed, thus, is precisely 
such situated, engaged and politically-attentive wisdom as a cultivated, practical virtue – a 
way of life (Hadot 1995) that also thereby includes an implicit knowledge-attentive ethics 
that is itself also processual, situated and pragmatic.   
 
To this Aristotelean account work of Flyvbjerg et al. (2013) adds an important Foucauldian 
twist, following Foucault’s later work on power.  Here, power is treated not in familiar 
juridico-discursive terms as that which is held by A over B and is illegitimate until it 
rationally consented to.  Instead, power is essentially productive, dispersed and normatively 
ambivalent – dangerous not bad – and constitutive of social phenomena in terms of the power 
relations between people and things, and thereby also of those people and things themselves 
as relata.  Moreover, amongst these things are concepts and knowledges as key mediations of 
this process of co-production, so that we have now constitutively strategic power/knowledges.  
Returning to phronesis, then, we can update the still-quite-rationalist Aristotelean account of 
phronesis to take into account the dynamic, complex constitution of things through 
power/knowledges.  Phronesis is thus not just a superior form of reasoning (itself supreme, as 
for Aristotle), but also the crucial process through which oneself and others may be brought 
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 to insightful strategic reflection upon how they are situated, and so constituted, within 
dynamic power/knowledge relations in real-time.   
 
A post-Foucauldian phronesis thus also yields a framework for analysis of TSS phenomena 
that is both distinctly resonant with ANT and yet also importantly different.  Instead of 
heterogeneous assemblages of empirical things, we explore reality as composed of complex, 
dynamic systems of power/knowledge relations and technologies or complex 
power/knowledge systems (CP/KS) (see Figure 1) (Tyfield, Ely & Geall 2015).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
This redefines ontological politics as an onto-politics (Cf epistemo-politics) in which, 
following ANT’s lead, both ontology and politics are redefined in active negotiation with 
each other.  An ontology of complex, dynamic systems of power/knowledge relations is akin 
to ANT’s in several key respects: (power-)knowledge is still incorporated within and as an 
achievement of specific enactments and complex, concrete condensations of human-with-
non-human things; the contingency and power-distributive effects of specific systems that 
prevail is preserved; hence there is no all-powerful and unquestioned/able presumption of a 
‘single reality’ that can do all kinds of (usually tacit) political (and epistemic) work, as 
opposed to the priority of the productive, strategic effects of knowledge claims in possibly 
constructing systems that tend to make their claims ‘real’; and thus the agents, knowledges 
and realities are both irreducibly dynamic achievements and strategic or political, in 
formation and effect.   
 
But it is also crucially different too: the systems are emergent, yielding a synchronic 
emergent powers materialism (Bhaskar 1998) that exceeds a rigorously-policed flat ontology 
(to the extent it is thus policed in ANT studies); so too, the constituent elements of systems 
are also emergent as relata; hence relationality is thorough-going, rather than limited to the 
relations amongst empirically-given things and so capable of yielding qualitatively new, as-
yet-non-actual ‘things’; and this relationality is taken as irreducibly strategic, constitutively 
oriented to its own preservation in any given case.  We are thus working with shifting 
relational assemblages, but as emergent, complex, dynamic systems, not ontologically flat 




 The mutually compatible combination of an ontology constituted by power/knowledge 
relations and an analysis that is phronetic in approach and motivation thus completely 
transforms the purpose of such studies as well. The goal is no longer to analyse existing 
closures and perhaps be enlightened by their evident (political) contingency, so changing 
minds (of the analyst/reader) and orientating them instead to concern.  But rather it is to 
examine possibly tendential processes of ongoing attempted closure in order to illuminate for 
participating actors their plausible prospective strategic positioning in the systems taking 
shape, and its interdependence on positioned others (human and non-human).  The latter, 
however, is itself precisely the process of ‘wise’ government of complex TSS systems, albeit 
no doubt initially just embryonic.  
 
For this ‘onto-politics’, therefore, ontology and reality is irreducibly and constitutively 
political, being constituted always in mediation by relations and technologies of 
power/knowledge.  To be is to be strategic.  Onto-politics is thus arguably ‘onto-’ in a more 
profound sense, concerning the substance of being real per se, than is ANT’s ontological 
politics, which seeks instead (only!) to highlight the hitherto neglected but essential 
contribution of (non-)human agencies to the contingent enabling of some humans.   While 
conversely, politics is reconceptualised as always primarily a matter of the rolling 
(re)production, in strategic material-discursive practice, of systems that are co-produced with 
specific power/knowledge relations and technologies that are ‘reality’, and the forms of 
living together – who with whom and on what terms – that they enable and disable.  Politics 
is thus indeed, with ANT, a never-ending process of strategic jockeying (incorporating both 
competition and collaboration, compulsion and consensus, argument and (possibly everyday) 
practice in interaction of human and non-human things), but also and primarily of world-
production conducted in ontic-enacting practice of everyday life, not (just) high-political 
argument and strategizing.   
 
This thus preserves but also entirely transforms what is ‘political’ about onto-politics, just as 
it transforms what is ‘onto-’ about it, in mutual redefinition.  Notably, against ontological 
politics, ‘politics’ remains distinctively human and emergent only from the irreducible 
presence in such human-non-human assemblages of the strategizing, cognizing zoon politikon 
that is the human in pursuit of their specific understanding of a ‘better world’; a strategic 
process (in the deflated Foucauldian sense described above) that is fundamentally about and 
conducted through the ontologically-constitutive power/knowledge relations of systems-
11 
 
 selves. It is onto-politics only insofar as it also involves the power/knowledge relations 
distinctive of, and constitutive of the emergence of, humans, but whose primary character is 
their ontological productivity, not argument, contestation and/or coercion. Such jockeying as 
constitutes ontological politics is more simply accounted for as ‘ontogeny’.   
 
Yet this is also not just the traditional notion of politics as a sphere pertaining to humans 
alone.  For it does not just ‘pertain’ to humans in the sense of ‘applying’ to humans alone, 
even as it does presuppose their presence, somewhere, in the assemblage under discussion.4  
Indeed, now constituted through relations with others, human and non-human, and their 
emergence in turn to greater systems, the concept formally known as ‘human agency’, as 
supposedly self-subsistent and answerable only to itself, is seen to be the emergent product of 
always concrete inter-dependent relations.  This is thus to bring human agency profoundly 
and permanently into question. This is, however, a question specifically for the self-reflective 
human agent; and one, moreover, that is again answerable only in reflective practice, based in 
an essentially pragmatic orientation of study of reflective, strategic interaction with the world. 
 
This shift to such a practical, phronetic basis is also arguably immanent in ANT ontological 
politics itself.  For an ANT ontological politics perspective implies the inclusion of the (ANT) 
analyst themselves in both such a world and the uncomfortable predicament of the 
axiological imperative confronting irreducible uncertainty to the exact same extent that it is 
itself a compelling analysis.  But this immediately subjects the very distinction of analyst-
agent to the same process of deconstruction as ANT has achieved for the subject-object 
dualism more broadly.  While this may not entail the total collapse of one onto the other (see 
below), it certainly does demand the profound reframing of ANT and/or ontological political 
analysis itself as primarily characterized by precisely the same epistemic shift that it counsels 
for knowledge and science more broadly, i.e. towards a pragmatic, processual orientation 
itself within and so working (messily) with complex, dynamic unknowable actor-networks.  
 
To admit this essentially pragmatic motivation and drive to, and immanent in, a post-ANT 
analysis, however, is also thereby dramatically to reframe the entire enterprise, as in the shift 
to phronetic CP/KS analysis.  For it means that the essentially analytical question of ANT 
regarding “what is ‘X’?” – “what actually is the manifest human-non-human assemblage and 
4 For instance, note how this onto-politics affords a spectrum of emergent strategicness as differences in degree 
not kind, e.g. for higher mammals.  
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 its current (here, now) closure that we unreflectingly refer to as ‘X’?” – is neither the first nor 
the last question implicit in that very train of thought.  Rather the motivation for even asking 
“what is ‘X’?” in the first place arises for a (human) agent and from their encounter with a 
problem in the world.  Moreover, this will likely be a difficult problem not answerable 
through the default first attempt at its resolution in which that thinking agent identifies the 
problem as (caused by) ‘X’ and the proceeds to attempt to deal with ‘X’ in practice.  Of 
course, this very often works, since our understanding of the world is sufficiently intelligent 
that we do indeed know the world as it is amenable to our given understanding – an 
understanding, after all, emergent from and in part constitutive of that world.   
 
But, as ANT would expect, it is also sometimes not the case that this approach works, and 
especially now regarding issues of TSS, since these are by definition realities constituted in 
ways that transgress our unreflective default understanding (i.e. ‘our’ as early 21st-century 
Westerners) in terms of ‘science’, ‘technology’ and ‘society’ (and ‘nature’).  In these 
instances, and others besides, therefore we need to ask the question of ANT ontological 
politics (or CP/KS) and adopt the productive disciplines of its conceptual poverty and 
empirical ‘flat’ ontology in order to attempt to construct more insightful conceptual 
innovations that, hopefully, can ‘see’ X and its world more clearly.5  
 
But what is meant by “more clearly”? How is it judged? The answer, of course, is in a further 
step beyond in which that revised ontological understanding – concrete and abstract – is 
tested in a new attempt to resolve the practical problem with which we started, to practical 
standards of satisfaction. Having rethought and reopened ‘X’, in other words, we are impelled 
to return to test and see what can now be done.  Of course, the strategic predicament of the 
limited constitutively-situated (human) agent remains unchanged as regards confronting a 
world of real but limitlessly unknowable recalcitrances of others. This new post-ANT-
analysis (or post-CP/KS-analysis) understanding, thus, does not reinstate the empty promise 
of ‘now’ knowing the world (around ‘us’) completely and comprehensively, with the 
concomitant and all-important promise of its potential mastery (also ‘for and by us’). But 
neither are we simply back where we started as regards our total ignorance of the 
recalcitrance that is currently frustrating us, even as we still interact with the the world in 
significant (indeed, overwhelming) ignorance as to its ‘actual’ constitution.   
5 I thank an anonymous referee from the idea of productive “conceptual poverty”. 
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Rather the analysis has made two crucial changes, in terms of what we have learned and what 
we are now open to and capable of learning, going forward. Simply going through this 
thought process we (will) have already learned much in both concrete and abstract about the 
practical problem field at hand.  Concrete insights cannot be specified here, of course, since 
they pertain only to the specific issue under consideration (though see below for an example).  
But abstractly we have learnt that the ‘objective’ reality we are confronting is not, in fact, an 
‘object’ at all – as supposedly fixed, monolithic, self-subsistent and substantial – but is 
constitutively relational, complex, dynamic and inchoate, as we are ourselves.  And so we 
have also become newly capable of learning – indeed, primed to learn further and be 
ourselves changed by – specifically how this given reality is each of these characteristics, 
through our ongoing experimental encounters, in practice, with world(s), thereby cultivating a 
newly informed and other-attentive phronetic stance.  
 
Returning to practice in this final step, however, raises one final problem for ontological 
politics and the need for its reframing.  For, back in an explicitly practice-oriented position 
ourselves, we find immediately that the opening of ‘X’, however much it may be insightful in 
its own right, fails in itself to assist us with deciding on the practical question of “what do I 
do next?”  To answer this question, which presents itself to us interminably including as the 
motivation for ANT itself as we have seen, is immediately and inescapably both: to demand 
some active reclosure, by that thinking self, of what ‘X’ is such that ‘I’ can now interact with 
it on the new, revised basis; and so, in turn, to adopt a position that, in practice, presupposes 
both the ontological monism of self and world and hence the epistemic dualism of subject-
object.  Such closure is thus productive, prospective, active and dangerous, and by ‘me’, not 
post hoc, already achieved by others (vis-à-vis the analytical gaze) and normatively 
appraisable.  It is the latter, however, that can be analysed by ANT and is implicit in its 
ontological politics.  Yet it is the former that is needed to be able to return finally to the 
practical problem and to its (possible, possibly temporary) closure in turn.    
 
This thus leads to arguably the fundamental philosophical difference between an ontological 
politics and onto-politics.  The watchword of the former is to stand against the cardinal sin of 
one-worldism, as an error not just of epistemic judgement but of ethical and (ontological) 
political domination.  On this account, one worldism – the positing of the twinned 
commitments of ontological monism and subject-object epistemic dualism – is precisely and 
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 directly to deny the foundational insights of such ontological politics that worlds are multiple 
and composed of contingent non-human and human (Western and non-Western) assemblages 
in which the agency of the (Western, male etc…) human is actually utterly dwarfed by that of 
the ‘others’ it thereby comes to dominate.  One-worldism is thus intrinsically and totally 
opposed to ontological politics and vice versa.   
 
Similarly, then, ontological politics can then be conceptualized in terms of a symmetrical 
contestation and negotiation between any number or quality of agencies that do not have to – 
indeed, should not – be accorded the rational, means-end calculative powers that would 
always privilege the (Western…) human over and to the detriment of all other agents.  To the 
contrary, what is needed, it is insisted, is a new conception of politics, and the agency implicit 
in it as a ‘politics’, that systematically redresses the imbalance away from the vastly greater 
but no less ‘real’ or ethically worthy collection of non- or ‘other’ human agencies that one-
worldism denies. 
 
To be sure, this is a compelling ethical call and one all the more important to heed carefully 
amidst the emergence of all the novel human-non-human agencies of global, cosmopolitized, 
planetary TSS and its problems of emergence.  But the problem is that it is only possible to 
stick righteously attached to this position insofar as one remains in the role of an observer-
analyst, which is thereby to reinstantiate the subject-object dualism and hence, not just to not 
contribute to the practical construction of TSS, but actively to participate in its continuing 
frustration.   
 
In order to respond to this call, then, we must do so in practice. And this demands a resuming 
a practical, engaged perspective, of ‘our’ agency in the world, situated within the complex 
heterogeneous assemblages and as ourselves; i.e. reflective, self-conscious and righteous 
(Haidt 2015) beings and hence as beings who spontaneously, relentlessly and unstoppably 
posit ontological monism and subject-object dualism. The option before us, then, is no longer 
one between retaining a regressive ontological monism or embracing an enlightened 
ontological politics – and both as explicit argued position – but of practically deploying 
ontological monism either unreflectively or reflectively, the latter being in the light of 
permanently discomforting insights regarding its fundamental groundlessness and normative 




 But this shift in perspective is much easier to take if the entire thought process has been 
conceptualized, from the outset, in the fundamentally pragmatic terms of phronesis and 
CPKS analysis.  For, from this perspective, ontological monism is no longer an irreparable 
and inexcusable mistake (of judgement). Rather it is an inescapable, world-productive and 
constitutive concomitant of distinctively human, cognizing agency – i.e. that is expressive of 
the real emergence in the world of humans in the human-non-human systems of relations 
from which that species being itself arises – but also an active ‘doing’ that can nonetheless be 
done more or less skilfully and with more or less situated strategic wisdom, or phronesis.   
Again, therefore, we converge finally on the cultivation of phronesis, which becomes both the 
challenge and its own solution, as in the emergence of (self-)government of TSS.  
 
Finally, then, this shift in perspective then illuminates the significant shift in our 
understanding of the conjunction of a complex heterogeneous ontology and politics as 
practice of possibly making the world better that still includes, but has fundamentally 
resituated, familiar epistemo-politics and in ways that can now be pursued in phronetic 
practice (albeit therefore fallibly and falteringly).  An ontological politics attempts to do away 
with and sideline epistemo-politics by theoretical fiat, arguing that it is mistaken and wrong 
while supposedly replacing it even as it affords no alternative from of prospective guidance.  
By contrast, onto-politics subsumes and reconstructs epistemo-politics as an enduring 
condition of being human, but one that can be pursued differently and better to the extent it is 
based in practices of phronesis.  
 
To be sure, an ANT ontological politics analysis can help significantly in this process in that, 
as itself a practice, it no doubt can and does cultivate, as embedded intuition (Cf Haidt 2015), 
the presumption that our ignorance of the world(s) we encounter massively outweighs our 
knowledge of them, and that those realities are precisely complex, dynamic, relational, 
systemic, inchoate etc… This can go towards transforming how it is we interact in and with 
the world.  But these changes come to nought unless and until they are brought back to 
changes effective in practical, complex-system-situated life and its productive encounters 
between mutually mysterious selves and worlds, including in STS research. Again, therefore, 





 Here, then, the world is still (and inescapably) encountered as an object by a subject, but 
where our very sense – perhaps only cognitively at first, but possibly more deeply over time – 
of these terms are themselves loosened, dynamized and brought closer together in ways that 
actively move away from subject-object dualism and ontological monism as practiced 
ontological commitments that unceasingly tend to the creation of world in their (split) image.  
Phronesis and CPKS thus definitely does not simply lead us back to a familiar politics and 
dualistic human agency even as these remain apparently in place.  For the cluster of attendant 
and constitutively relational (intensional and inter-dependently defined) concepts surrounding 
that familiar constellation of epistemo-political concepts has been entirely transformed, both 
in form and in substance: now as self-consciously constitutively relational, complex, systemic, 
dynamic and pragmatic in form; and substantively inseparable from novel concepts of 
phronesis and its cultivation, productive power/knowledge relations and emergent systems 
thereof, government and its grounding in self-government and, of course, TSS.  
 
In short, going beyond ANT ontological politics, we need a programme of phronetic analysis 
of the emerging co-production of technoscience innovations and forms of TSS government.  
For this will then move towards a productive onto-politics that can itself enable and 
instantiate practical (cosmo-political) projects of ‘transition’, or world creation and 
reconstruction, and their ongoing wise government.   
 
Returning to STS research, then, this is thus a programme that can only be delivered by way 
of concrete, situated and engaged analysis, not abstract theorizing.  To illustrate it at work, 
therefore, we turn to a key global challenge of emerging TSS: low-carbon urban mobility 
transition in China.  Our question here is: how (when, by what/whom (Savransky 2013)) is 
urban mobility changing  and in co-production with what emerging trajectories of socio-
political regimes?  To repeat, though, this is addressed with a view to practically informing 
diverse forms of onto-political strategic redirection, not to ‘get the answer right’. 
 
4 E-mobility in China: the Politics of Who ‘I’ (and ‘China’) May Become 
A key contemporary site of the emergence of an onto-political techno-science-society is low-
carbon innovation in urban mobility in China (Tyfield et al. 2015).  It is an important case 




 First, as ‘low-carbon’ and ‘innovation’ it relates directly to contemporary (techno-science-
societal) efforts to forge new ecologically sustainable forms of life in response to the multiple 
environmental global risks reaped by/in the emergence of TSS to date; as well, therefore, as 
the new predicaments of the Anthropocene, cast in official Chinese policy in the slogan of 
‘Ecological civilization’.  ‘Innovation’ is also, of course, a fetishized policy buzzword 
demanding critical attention by STS (Godin 2006).  Then as ‘urban’ it achieves particular 
significance with the 21st century emergence of humanity as a predominately urban species; 
with cities as key sites of ecological footprint and innovation; and with cities (especially in 
the ‘global South’) as key sites of what ‘living together’ will actually be like for the majority 
in the 21st century.  Urban mobility is, in turn, a crucial element of all of the three previous 
terms, as well as a central social practice and socio-technical and political system constitutive 
of (emerging) techno-science-societies (Urry 2007). Finally, in China we find how each of 
these, and other major issues besides, attains global superlatives; including as the world’s 
largest (and still rapidly growing) car market, the world’s top emitter of GHGs on an absolute 
basis (with per capita emissions also now overtaking those of the EU), and site of the largest 
and fastest (ongoing) urbanization in history that will greatly shape the global environmental 
impact of future humanity.   
 
In this context of titanic structures and movements, the decarbonisation and cleaning (and 
decongestion) of Chinese urban mobility is an increasingly pressing imperative – for Chinese 
society itself, as well as the planet.  As regards the practical question motivating study of this 
case, therefore, we are concerned with not just expediting but qualitatively shaping ‘low-
carbon transition’ in Chinese urban mobility such that (techno-science-)social futures they 
instantiate are not just green (for some) but also equitable, empowering and convivial, i.e. 
politically enabling for the broadest possible group of human and non-human agents.  
 
Certainly, there can be no doubt that the intense interest in e-mobility in China  is profoundly 
political. For instance, the coming of e-mobility is seen as a unique industrial opportunity by 
the Chinese government of breaking into the vaunted global citadel of the global automotive 
majors by ‘overtaking around the corner’, through taking the lead in the plug-in electric car 
(EV).  This is then manifest in perhaps the world’s most ambitious national industrial policy, 
of a technology-push policy orthodoxy, supporting the EV, and applied to an industry that is 
still substantially state-owned within a country that supposedly has especially strong 
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 authoritarian levers for top-down initiatives.  Surely, then, China should be a ferment of new 
EV-based innovation, leading the world, and saving the planet to boot?  
 
In fact, there is no such leadership in evidence.  Rather, for all its support by government 
(across many levels), Chinese mobility today primarily evidences not accelerating low-
carbon transition, but deepening ICE automobility system, at extraordinary pace and scale.  
Even to the extent EV sales are growing, they remain comparatively minuscule – a sales 
surge in late 2015 perhaps reaching 1.5% of the comparable annual sales of ICE cars, let 
alone the total number on Chinese roads and still maybe 25% below government targets 
(Bloomberg 2015). This certainly augurs no meaningful transition at system level at current 
rates for many decades.  These sales are also utterly dependent on governmental subsidies, 
the continuation of which has recently been brought into question as widespread fraud has 
emerged (in turn, also raising questions about how many of the ‘record breaking’ 2015 sales 
figures were real EVs (Yang 2016)). 
 
“Why, or rather how, are things working out this way?” thus becomes the tricky (“what is 
‘X’?”) problem of conceptual innovation for a CP/KS analysis. But it is not the only one 
posed by contemporary low-carbon e-mobility in innovation and mainstream policy 
understandings.  Another, of equal significance, arises from the extraordinary – and starkly 
contrasting – success of the the e-bike or electric two-wheeler (E2W).  Over 200 million of 
these now ply China’s road (more than ICE cars, let alone EVs), the vast majority of which 
are themselves Chinese brands.  This is thus an existing global industrial success story that 
also has the potential to place Chinese innovation at the global core of a new, affordable, 
lighter-footprint and ‘liveable’ model of urban auto-mobility of China’s burgeoning mega-
cities (and those across the global South more generally).  Yet far from embracing this 
opportunity, we find instead only its containment, if not outright rejection, by government, 
with E2Ws banned in many big cities and a major, nationally-coordinated clampdown on 
them in spring 2016.  This, therefore, raises precisely the same question, where the stasis of 
both the EV and of the E2W contributes to the overall weakness of low-carbon transition 
more generally.  
 
The central relevance of the foregoing discussion regarding onto-politics comes through in 
this case study in three key aspects.  First, the key point emerging from these two concrete 
problematics is that while low-carbon transition is fervently desired, what is currently 
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 systematically lacking – and missed by policy (analysis) – is a clear and present constellation 
of agencies that may be identified as the primary producers and beneficiaries of such a 
transition.  In other words, the key question, that can only be answered in concrete (as ANT 
would counsel), of “who and what is – or will power – Chinese e-mobility transition?” 
(Tyfield 2014) is not only generally overlooked but also currently without answer.  Yet the 
practical, strategic predicament compels precisely furnishing some (faltering, incomplete, 
initial) sense of which closure, for and by whom/what.  Through the lens of phronetic CPKS 
analysis, in short, we see that the fundamental question for expediting low-carbon transition 
is the fundamentally onto-political and prospective one of “which qualitatively new, 
constitutively strategic agencies will be co-produced (will come to exist) with, and in the 
process of, e-mobility transition?”6  This is thus a question that can be addressed neither by a 
conventional analysis of political manoeuvring and/or transition, working with and assuming 
only existing agencies, nor an ANT analysis, which makes no such assumption but struggles 
to address the prospective question.  Rather we must to trace embryonic emergent dynamic 
feedback loops amongst artefacts, situated everyday practices amidst environmental risks, 
subjectivities and stratifications, cityscapes, regulations and high-level innovations policies 
and investment strategies in the possible emergence of qualitatively novel complex systems 
of power/knowledge relations. 
 
Secondly, though, an onto-political analysis is needed because the problem field is not only 
thereby irreducibly onto-political (i.e. concerning what irreducibly political beings exist) but 
is also experienced as such in everyday life with an intensity that is uncommon, especially 
against a presumed Western ‘normality’.  This has three key aspects.  First is the particular 
lived relevance in everyday life of the question above but translated into the first person as 
the essentially onto-political question of “Who will I (myself and my country, as Chinese) 
become?” This question presents itself as banal and everyday amidst a rapidly changing and 
individualizing Chinese society that is widely appreciated by those living it to be dynamic, 
pitiless, still in formation and littered with intense existential human-non-human-assembled 
dangers regarding, e.g., food safety and air quality (Yan 2010, Ren 2013, Han & Shim 2010).  
Here, in other words, it is a common-sense, lived reality that everything – one’s very future 
being – is potentially at stake, conditioning a profound competition of social status and 
equally profound distrust of socio-technical-natural risks.   
6 Where the terms in bold and underlined respectively go together.  
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Moreover, while not, of course, necessarily conversant with the avant garde heights of 
mobilities theory (Urry 2007), mobility choices nonetheless are appreciated to be highly 
significant in this regard, reflecting how strongly (personal positions within) mobility systems 
condition and are co-produced with ‘who we are’ (Kaufmann 2010, Sheller & Urry 2016).  
Such concerns play out, for instance, in the intense Chinese consumer identity politics of ‘car’ 
ownership, with an entrenched common-sense preference for the existential security 
represented by a private, foreign-built (hence high technical quality), big and expensive (ICE) 
car: as in the now famous catch-phrase of a young female game-show contestant who would 
rather ‘cry in the back of a BMW, than laugh on the back of a bicycle’.   
 
Yet, and secondly, this is far from being a settled, sedimenting and stable common-sense.  
Rather contemporary Chinese e-mobility innovation reveals the essential onto-political 
contestation of a set of mobility systems all of which are currently ‘monsters’, i.e. precisely 
politically controversial in their very existence,  This would include the massively incumbent 
ICE model just described, since this is palpably and permanently beyond the reach of a huge 
proportion of the population, and simply has no prospect of attaining to the aspired American 
levels of penetration without catastrophic planetary (i.e. onto-political) environmental and 
economic consequences.   
 
Alongside the rapacious monster of late 20th century ICE auto-mobility, gorging itself not just 
on fossil fuels, but also land and clean air, however, the monstrousness of the EV and the 
E2W (both as emergent mobility systems) is even clearer, albeit more ‘hopeful’ (Cf Mokyr 
1991, Law 1991).  On the one hand, then, we find what may be informatively caricatured as 
the revolted rejection of the (systems of the) EV as a hideous parody of the ‘real’ internal 
combustion engine (ICE) car; a Frankenstein… in green lipstick.  Faced with the deep-seated 
ontological concerns for one’s future security and very identity, the ‘monstrous’ but still 
expensive EV offers only inadequate and uncertain (onto-political) boost to one’s status to 
compensate for its new (onto-political) frustrations and risks, as in persistent anxieties about 
charging and/or being stranded (e.g. on a congested ring-road), financial risks of rapid 
depreciation and/or personal hazards (e.g. high-profile battery explosions and a widespread 




 Yet on the other, for all its unquestionable demand, the E2W too is a monster.  It inhabits a 
grey area both legally – in terms of regulations of its use (e.g. licence/registration required?) 
and production (e.g. standards) –, and regarding (industrial) policy – at best ignored as a 
potential Chinese global industrial champion, but also, at worst, penalized off the roads.  This 
monstrousness must also be understood in onto-political terms.  Crucial here is the larger 
context of the E2W’s production and use.  China is a highly dynamic society shaped by two 
key processes that are together amongst the most illustrative examples of the exceptional 
conjunction of deepening economic liberalism (‘Reform & Opening Up’ to globalization) and 
continued one-party-state government: respectively, migration from the countryside to the 
burgeoning industries of China’s cities and the authoritarian biopolitics of the household 
registration system (hukou), that ties every citizen primarily to one location (classified as 
‘rural’ or ‘urban’) for access to social services.  
 
Together, this has created two clear and formally-defined tiers of society with only limited 
social movement between them, but with massive numbers of ‘rural’ citizens now in cities.  
This stratification is then performed and reproduced not just in terms of different employment 
but also – in the full gamut of human-non-human assemblages constitutive of the difference 
in lives – in dress, gait and language and in urban zoning, standards of housing and 
conspicuous consumer choices, not least of which is an auto-mobile vehicle: a car (and a 
‘good’ car) being an expensive acquisition out of reach to the majority as against an 
affordable E2W.  The onto-politics of individualised competitiveness regarding identity and 
possible projected life-course (“who will I become?”) thus become particularly heightened, 
crystallizing in the key symbol of one’s access to mobility – both physical and, thence, social 
(Cf Kaufmann 2010).  
 
In this context, then, the proliferation of E2Ws – the growth of this monstrous new enabled 
agency – is primarily viewed by many, including government at different levels, not as a 
fantastic opportunity to shape a new, Chinese-dominated and China-appropriate (given the 
density of cities) e-mobility system, but as an existential ‘security threat’, with bans of them 
in several major cities.  This takes many forms. At its most mundane it refers to the new 
menace of silent, quick, dangerous mobility, compounded by the unruliness of its use (on and 
off pavements, the wrong way down roads, skipping red lights, maybe veering unpredictably 
across traffic).  Undeniably underlying and mediating this security discourse, however, is the 
imaginary of e-bike users as  ‘low quality’ (suzhi) (Anagnost 2004) citizens vividly and 
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 readily exemplified in the transparent division of urban society into residents and migrants 
(‘peasant workers’).  While systemically-essential demotic mobility, underpinning China’s 
continuing (if slowing) economic ‘miracle’, therefore, the e-bike also enables the ‘wrong’ 
people regarding the key form of contemporary government that is ‘govern-mobility’ 
(Bæronholdt 2013) – the people no-one aspires to become but rather fear (themselves falling 
back among), especially those constituencies currently most politically enabled. Similarly, 
against a widespread understanding of car-based automobility as the acme of modernity, from 
a Chinese state perspective of national industrial profile and visible urban landscape to the 
imagined rich-world tourist the e-bike is a symbol of a backward, ‘developing’ country, not 
one to be cultivated as the acme of 21st century green city living.   
 
The result is the dynamic monster of the E2W (system): unruly, unfamiliar, dangerous and 
growing, yet also unregulated and unregulatable, let alone amenable to being banned or 
eliminated.  But amid such widespread disquiet, or even governmental rejection, neither does 
the E2W threaten actual system change in competition with the parallel protean growth of the 
incumbent ICE car system.  In short, as things stand, the answer to the question of “who is 
(the new agency co-produced with the transition to) e-mobility?” is a set of monsters that are 
monstrous precisely in the uncertain but potentially existential onto-political threat they pose 
to existing agencies.  To be perfectly clear, therefore, the landscape of Chinese e-mobility 
transition in 2016 presents no clear options that could be embraced by a (more) rational 
politics (critical and bottom-up and/or managerial and top-down).  Instead, as an essentially 
onto-political arena, the strategic question of “what will ultimately prevail and how?” offers 
itself to the analysis only in terms of tracing the complex strategic relations and interactions 
of the present, and the (possibly technological) mediations thereof, and how these could 
productively play out into the construction of entirely new mobility systems-cum-
sociopolitical relations; and with this as lived predicament, not just theoretical conundrum.   
 
This thus points to the third crucial way in which this case is fundamentally onto-political, 
namely how it is contested in actual practice and thereby being brought into being.  The 
constraints in contemporary China regarding explicit epistemo-political contestation 
compound this, though issues of mobility, such as parking or clean air (Geall 2013) are in fact 
amongst the issues regarding which amongst their freest. But arguably more important are the 
no less intense, but banal, everyday and material contestation of (yet-to-be-settled) 
settlements of the power/knowledge relations of the ever-emerging green mobility systems 
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 (e.g. practices of human-non-human encounters with charging infrastructures, weathers and 
clothing, pavements or traffic signals or the movements of other vehicles…).  
 
The use of hundreds of millions of E2Ws every day in such humdrum but strategically 
productive ways by people just living their lives (vs. radical epistemo-politics), however, 
adds up to the persistent and consequential consternation of the top-down regime, feeding its 
equally existential determination to shape the very existence of the population – the 
subjectivities and socio-technical relations constitutive of a future China – in ways that 
preserve its monopoly of state power.  The result, therefore, is the dynamic of contemptuous 
rejection of the E2W by the party-state, despite its seeming promise from the perspective of 
both expedited low-carbon transition and even techno-nationalist political economy, and its 
resilient persistence.  Conversely, the EV has persisted to date, despite its widespread onto-
political rejection and consequent lack of demand, because of the onto-political project it 
bears for the party-state in the construction of a prosperous, green and globally-
competitive … and CCP-led… China.   
 
The key dynamic of contemporary e-mobility innovation, thus, is the dynamic clash between 
existing (ontopolitical) constituencies (and power/knowledge relations) and the emergent 
socio-technical monsters they support regarding “who/what ‘I’ will become” in the context of 
an urgence of rapid and individualizing social and planetary-environmental change, with 
potentially everything to lose and/or gain; and one in which mobility (physical and socio-
economic) and there parallel emergence of socio-technical mobility systems and 
subjectivities occupies a central role.   To the extent any clear conclusions can be drawn from 
this constitutively strategic process, therefore, what seems clearest is that both are converging 
on the increasingly self-conscious and deliberate attempt actively to shape the meaning of the 
greatest prize available in this contest, namely the very form and meaning of burgeoning 
Chinese ‘middle class’.  For it is this still-as-yet-undefined agency in particular that appears 
to be the answer to the question of “who is Chinese e-mobility transition?” – as the future 
monster but now domesticated (Zuev  & Tyfield 2016) – since it is in claiming this label as 
constitutively connected in everyday common-sense with a specific model of e-mobility that 
such a model stands to amass the greatest power momentum towards its successful 




 As regards some meaningful practical guidance that can arise from this analysis, therefore, it 
directs us to consideration of the multiple ways in which ‘middle class’-ness is being co-
produced today with such e-mobility innovation, and the multiple possible (essentially 
political and strategic) future mobility systems to which this could lead.  This is thus to reach 
the final way in which onto-politics is crucial to this analysis, namely in terms of presenting 
just such emergent futures, e.g. as a set of plausible scenarios, to multiple agents and 
stakeholders with whom they are then discussed, refined and republicized to stimulate yet 
broader strategic – phronetic – reflection.  In the case of this particular research, this was 
done through a bilingual workshop held in Shenzhen in March 2016 to over 40 Chinese 
stakeholders – from government, business (both ‘big’ and ‘start-up’), NGOs and civil society, 
and academia (both staff and students).7    
 
Of course, this is hardly the only, or necessarily the best, way to do this, though.  Rather, the 
very framing of situated strategic and informative/informed interventions in concrete public 
TSS issues demands, in itself, forms of situated practical wisdom for judgement regarding 
whatever ways present themselves as most promising given the issue, issue-public and 
incumbent power/knowledge relations at hand.  This may take the form of familiar public, 
perhaps even polemical, interventions stimulating public discussion about issues hitherto not 
seen or overlooked. But it may not. And indeed, in the case of low-carbon urban mobility in 
China, given current limitations on free speech (i.e. epistemo-politics), this was hardly a 
viable option.   
 
What is clear from this case study, though, is how the lens of ontopolitics illuminates every 
stage of its analysis, from conception of its motivation to framing of its goals via 
methodological choice and theoretical/substantive approach and insights.  As regards the 
latter, for instance, this is not just a familiar case of post-socialist identity politics since what 
it precisely is not is a matter of ‘catch-up’ to a given and stable socio-political model, these 
being exactly what is essentially in question and for planetary reasons.  Nor it is just a 
familiar case of authoritarian politics failing to contain a bottom-up overspill and 
mushrooming appetite for (TSS-enabled realization of) greater individual autonomy, since it 
is also and essentially a matter of how everyday onto-political practices by that very same 
individualizing but security-thirsty citizenry serve to perform, reinstantiate and possibly 




                                                 
 transform the power relations of the party-state, as with E2Ws.  And nor, of course, is it just a 
familiar case of authoritarian state-capitalist ‘power’ getting its wicked way, since the EV is 
struggling, and for ontopolitical reasons. Rather, it is a case that is amenable only to the onto-
political gaze, and thereby, in turn, demanding of insightful phronetic engagement not correct, 
arms-length analysis.  
 
5 Conclusion – STS as Midwife of TSS? 
How does this approach furnish (the beginnings of) an answer to what a STS for and in TSS 
might look like, doing reconstitutive strategic and ethical work?  Space forbids all but the 
briefest and programmatic presentations of an entire research programme.  But the outlines 
are clear.  For the example above illuminates a series of existing problems but where these 
are also openings and indeed responsibilities for STS, as well as providing the capacity to 
respond to them, regarding both orientation and ways to do so.   
 
First, the meso-level dynamic of the emerging Chinese middle classes and its ongoing active 
shaping not only highlights likely embryonic trajectories of innovation-cum-socio-political 
change. But it also allows us to place ourselves imaginatively amongst this emergent power-
knowledge system and ask about who will be the winners and losers in this emerging techno-
science-society and how.  This then allows us (i.e. you, reader) to ask questions about where 
society may be going now, making ‘present’ as lively political issues potentially constitutive 
socio-political divisions of future techno-science-society that are currently just emergent.  
And with that comes the responsibility to do something about it.  Yet, since what is described 
are problems of emerging ontopolitics, and the ongoing and uncertain constitution of futures, 
this also crucially qualifies the register of the analysis in ways that are then potentially 
empowering: both politically, viz. the possibility of strategic action framed by this possible 
future and at a time when these (political) realities have not yet taken definitive shape; and 
epistemically, viz. shedding the impossible burden of getting the (single) future ‘right’.  An 
ANT ontological politics, unless based in an engaged programme, tends not to be able to 
assist with such prospective guidance.  A CP/KS phronesis, by contrast, asks: “Which ‘one 
world’ is being constructed? For and by whom? Could it be otherwise? and, How?” (Cf 
Flyvbjerg et al. 2013).  Here, then, STS both forges and grasps a strategic window and 
opportunity for intervention by way of the power/knowledge technologies that it itself is also 




 Secondly, though, what is to guide this process of (modest but committed) strategic 
intervention? The answer lies in the foregoing discussion of complex power/knowledge 
systems and the vision that emerges from that of the phronetic society: multiple practices of 
situated practical wisdom, governing the multiple and growing techno-science-social 
innovations, and thereby generating – through a learning-by-doing, not as trial-and-error but 
rather as a building-by-exerting-oneself-to-be – strategically wise self-government of the 
complex systems, thereby constituting the emergence of technosciencesociety habitable for 
humanity.  But this is also inseparable from the parallel emergence of its ‘critical’ (but also 
constitutive) politics, to which STS is crucial.  For here STS itself is self-consciously 
reframed – from the outset of any specific concrete analysis – as new paradigm of 
‘knowledge production’ as virtue practice of situated strategic wisdom.  STS thus becomes a 
professionalized practice of cultivation of power/knowledge technologies for maximal 
strategic reflection and ethical reflexivity amongst as broad a human and non-human public 
as possible on issues of techno-science and innovation and their respective implications for 
who and what is (becoming) and how.  In short, as stewards and physicians (perhaps with our 
own Hippocratic oath) of the complex, equitable and democratic government of 
technosciencesociety.  
 
In short, if ontological politics comes ‘after ANT’, then – to answer Mol’s (1999: 87) seminal 
question – perhaps we can say (or hope) that, amidst the turbulent emergence or birth pangs 
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